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While most contemporary historians agree that the use of debt peonage as a coercive labor contract
in Mexico was not widespread, scholars still concur that it was important and pervasive in Yucatan
state during the henequen boom of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The henequen boom concurred
with the long rule of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910), under whose watch property rights were reallocated
through land laws, and Mexico’s economy became much more closely tied to the United States. In
the Yucatan, the accumulation of debts by peons rose as hacendados sought to attract and bond workers
to match the rising U.S. demand for twine. We examine the institutional setting in which debt operated
and analyze the specific functions of debt: who got it, what form it took, and why it varied across workers.
We stress the formal and informal institutional contexts within which hacendados and workers negotiated
contracts.
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tnonnenm@allegheny.eduDebt and contract slavery is the prevailing system of production all over the south of 
Mexico…Under this system the laborer is compelled to give service to the farmer, or 
hacendado, to accept what he wishes to pay, and even to receive such beatings as he 
cares to deliver. Debt, real or imaginary, is the nexus that binds the peon to his master. 
Though the constitution does not recognize the right of the creditor to take and hold the 
body of the debtor, the rural authorities everywhere recognize such a right and the 
result is that probably 5,000,000 people, or one-third of the entire population, are today 
living in a sate of helpless peonage.  
John Kenneth Turner 1910, 92-93. 
 
Introduction 
Turner’s account of debt peonage in Yucatan – first published in the muckracking 
journal the American Magazine – made an immediate impact on Americans’ perceptions 
of their southerly neighbors, and became the text to which all future scholars of 
Yucatan’s labor conditions first turn. Turner built a compelling narrative of slavery and 
oppression on Yucatecan haciendas and argued that these conditions were due to the 
policies of Mexico’s long-time president, Porfirio Díaz, whose overthrow he advocated. 
Subsequent scholars have modified Turner’s account, carefully detailing the institutional 
and cultural context of labor conditions on Porfirian henequen haciendas. However, a 
paucity of data has made it difficult to heavily revise Turner’s initial findings, and no one 
has directly tied the broader setting to the specific timing and function of debts. In this 
paper, we strike a balance between the critics of debt peonage who see it as pure 
exploitation and apologists who claim that debt peonage in Yucatan was not as harsh or 
as widespread as critics suggest. While many scholars have examined debt peonage 
during this period using qualitative methods, we utilize economic theory and data 
analysis to examine the existence and persistence of this institution. 
Almost all labor contracts have multiple margins in addition to a wage. When 
monitoring costs loom large, as they always did in pre-mechanized agriculture, 
employers negotiated contracts that reduced these costs. Agriculture is characterized 
by high seasonal demands for labor or relative labor scarcity in “boom” times. In 
response to relative labor scarcity, agricultural producers raise salaries but may also 
alter other margins of contracts in order to tie laborers to their farms. On henequen   2
haciendas in the Yucatan, the most striking aspect of labor contracts is that workers 
accumulated large debts “on the books” that hacendados never expected to be repaid. 
While large upfront transfers with no chance of repayment may at first glance seem to 
be an inefficient means of attracting and motivating labor, we argue that within 
Yucatan’s institutional and cultural setting debt served both of these functions.  
In this paper, we advance three larger points concerning debt peonage in 
Yucatan. First, we argue that even though the institutional setting during this period was 
coercive and designed to favor hacendado interests, workers still made choices and 
responded to incentives. Had conditions outside the hacienda been less coercive, 
bargaining power would certainly have shifted in favor of workers, because labor was 
scarce during the heyday of henequen.
1 Second, the specific form that debt took in the 
Yucatan was shaped by cultural and social norms. The ruling elite drew on these norms, 
shared by Maya and non-Maya alike, to increase the demand for debt at a young age, 
in particular by encouraging increases in the size and expense of marriages. Finally, 
debt was part of a system of paternalism that compensated workers on multiple margins 
and increased loyalty to hacendados.
2  
The henequen boom begins with the invention of the mechanical reaper in the 
U.S. and the mechanical rasper in the Yucatan. Our study ends when the revolution 
“came to Yucatan,” leading to the cancellation of workers’ debts and the establishment 
of a minimum wage.
3  Our study therefore roughly coincides with the rule of Porfirio 
Díaz from 1876 to 1910. While the revolution swept the rest of Mexico beginning in 
1910, elites in Yucatan held off its arrival until 1915, when General Carranza sent in his 
                                                       
1 See Steinfeld and Engerman (1997) for a discussion of the various meanings of the words “coercion” 
and “free.” 
2 Consistent with our view was the absence of perpetual debt for non-Mayan workers. The general 
mechanism that we have in mind is very similar to the paternalistic agricultural labor contracts used in the 
U.S. South from the late 19
th century until cotton was mechanized in the 1960s (Alston and Ferrie 1999). 
Our argument builds on the work of Wells and Joseph (1996) for their understanding of the institutional 
setting, Peniche (1998; 1994) for her work on the importance of Maya rituals and debt, and Nickel (1997a; 
1996) for his research on the use and size of debts. 
3 While debt peonage was officially outlawed in Mexico in 1914, Haber, Razo, and Mauer (2003, 335) 
argue that the revolution had little immediate effect on production levels. The number of debt peons has 
been estimated at 20,767 in 1880; 80,216 in 1900; and 125,000 in 1910 (Joseph 1986, 55). 
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“constitutionalist” troops. The revolution brought to an end the institutional setting within 
which labor contracting took place during the Porfiriato.  
Because of its importance in shaping contracts, we begin Section II with a 
discussion of the institutional context at the federal level followed by the institutional 
specifics of the Yucatan region.  In Section III we discuss how the ecological 
characteristics of the Yucatan and the cultivation of henequen in particular influenced 
the use of labor.  Section IV begins with a discussion of the multiple margins of labor 
compensation on henequen haciendas, including a description of overall labor 
conditions. We then review the literature on debt peonage followed by our hypotheses 
concerning debt and contracting which stress the importance of understanding the 
formal and informal contexts within which contracting transpires. Finally, in Section V we 
present a case study of a henequen hacienda, Itzincab-Cámara, from which we provide 
evidence consistent with these arguments.  
IIa. Institutional context: federal  
After decades of almost constant struggle between conservatives and liberals, 
Porfirio Díaz came to power in 1876 determined to bring stability to a fractured nation. 
While consistently maintaining his opposition to re-election, he served several 
consecutive terms in office until he was overthrown by revolutionary forces and sent into 
exile in 1910.
4 During his time in office, Díaz sought to modernize Mexico and brooked 
little dissent from those who opposed his vision of progress. Díaz sought to unify 
Mexico’s distinct regions to create a strong centralized nation, and he did this by greatly 
concentrating control in the office of the Presidency.  
Díaz measured progress and modernization with metrics such as the miles of 
railroad tracks laid and the percentage of land dedicated to export crops (e.g., 
henequen, chicle, sugar, and cotton). On these measures, the country progressed 
greatly. Much of the capital for Mexico’s economic expansion came from foreign 
                                                       
4 From 1880-84 Díaz stepped down as president and was replaced by Manuel González, a general and 
Díaz loyalist. Given Díaz’s extensive power behind the scenes, these four years are typically not placed 
outside the “Porfiriato.”  
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investors. U.S. investors, for example, financed the railroad system and, by the end of 
the Porfiriato, owned some 20% of all Mexican land.  
The law of the land during the Porfiriato was the 1857 constitution. Despite 
violating its provisions when necessary, Díaz did not seek to abrogate it; liberals viewed 
this Constitution as the quintessential symbol of Mexican nationalism (Guerra, 1988, 
29). Indeed, a bloody civil war had been fought over it and liberals had triumphed. The 
enumeration of individual rights in this Constitution was, as one prominent Mexican 
historian put it, “practically exhaustive” (Guerra 1988, 33). In terms of labor, the 
Constitution prohibited the rendering of personal service without just compensation and 
full consent.
5 The 1856 Reform Laws of the previous year had abolished all corporate 
forms of land ownership; the 1857 Constitution reiterated this prohibition, which was 
primarily aimed at the Church. The stripping of corporate property rights also greatly 
facilitated the expropriation of communal lands from indigenous communities, many of 
which had previously owned lands as pueblos, or villages. According to the Reform 
Laws, village ejido land was to be divided among heads of families, each receiving a 
small parcel (Wells and Joseph 1996, 151). In effect, the 1857 Constitution substituted 
group rights and privileges with individual rights. Despite its lofty rhetoric, however, 
average citizens had little recourse to defend themselves when abuses occurred. 
Political parties and elections were elite affairs and not expressions of popular will. 
During the Porfiriato, official candidates were chosen for all regional and local elections, 
with the President himself often intervening in elections of national importance (Guerra 
1988, 39). Elections were solemnly observed in strict accordance with the law, serving 
mainly to legitimize and strengthen the power of the central government as arbitrator of 
disputes among the political elite. Supreme Court justices were also elected for six-year 
terms and were similarly indebted to the President for their positions.  
If the Díaz administration privileged foreign investors, at the other end of the 
spectrum were workers and peasants, who protested more openly and with greater 
frequency after the turn of the century. Díaz did not hesitate in using the army to put 
down strikers and rebel Indians. In 1901 he sent the army north, brutally suppressing a 
                                                       
5 Slavery was outlawed in Mexico at Independence. 
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long-simmering rebellion by the Yaqui, a largely nomadic people who lived in relative 
autonomy from the state.
6 In the same year, Díaz dispatched General Ignacio Bravo to 
the Yucatan peninsula to put an end to the decades-old Caste War that had begun in 
1847 but was still very much alive in the eastern region of the state. After the most 
intense years of fighting, from 1847-1849, rebel Maya Indians fled to the forested 
jungles of southeastern Yucatan, where they lived in autonomous communities outside 
the state’s reach. In May of 1901, Bravo and his troops captured and occupied the 
rebels’ most important town, declaring the end of a conflict that had been long and 
bloody.  
 
IIb. Institutional Context: Yucatan State 
The Díaz years brought more than a measure of political stability to Yucatan, 
which, like much of the rest of Mexico during the early to mid-nineteenth century, was 
characterized by frequent changes of government. Between 1848 and 1873, for 
example, the state had 26 governors, including seven in 1873 (Wells and Joseph 1996, 
22). Díaz installed military governors, set up a political machine, and stabilized the rules 
of the game by which elites in Yucatan interacted. Succession of power in Yucatan 
during these years was “without bloodshed or unnecessary emotions,” not something 
that could be taken for granted before 1876 (Reed 1964, 230). 
Political and economic power overlapped, and in Yucatan economic power 
increasingly became tied to a single export crop: henequen. During the henequen boom 
the state was described as “one vast cleared plantation” (Reed 1964, 220). Exports of 
henequen rose from less than 6 million kilos in 1875 to 43 million in 1885 and to 81 
million in 1900. The political power of hacendados increased concomitantly. Perhaps 
the most blatant example of the relationship between economic and political power was 
the 1902 election of Olegario Molina as governor of Yucatan. Molina was the owner of 
the state’s largest henequen export house whose power to control production increased 
when his company signed a pact with International Harvester in 1902. In effect, this 
                                                       
6 In 1908 Yaqui Indians from the north were imported to the Yucatan as henequen workers. Federal 
authorities believed that the best way to subdue the Yaqui was to separate them from their homelands, 
the Mayo and Yaqui river valleys in Sonora (Wells 1985, 68).  
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“secret” pact guaranteed lower prices for henequen in exchange for being the sole 
supplier to International Harvester (Joseph 1982, 45).
7  
As a result of the “green gold,” Yucatan went from being one of the poorest 
states in the republic to one of the richest. The transformation of the northwestern 
region of the state into a mono-crop economy happened relatively quickly and was 
moved along significantly by the Caste War.
8 The early years of the conflict shifted the 
bulk of the state’s population westward toward Merida and away from the rebels in the 
southeast, making additional laborers available for work on the expanding lands 
dedicated to henequen production. Additionally, the heaviest fighting and casualties of 
the war occurred in the sugar-producing region around Valladolid and Tekax, destroying 
many sugar plantations in its wake (Reed 1964, 147).
9 Between deaths and 
displacement, the first decade of the conflict claimed between one-third and one-half of 
Yucatan’s population of 600,000 (Joseph 1982; Reed 1964, 122; Rugeley 1996, xii). 
From 1750 to 1850, cattle and corn haciendas dominated the rural landscape of 
Yucatan. As these haciendas expanded, owners used their political power to 
appropriate communal lands from nearby villages. Some displaced peasants were 
pushed onto these haciendas when communal lands were broken up; others were 
pressured through the accumulation of debt. Eiss (2007, 9) notes that by 1841 in the 
town of Hunucmá, a district on the western edge of the henequen zone, some 24% of 
the total population resided on haciendas and ranches. However, over the course of the 
second half of the nineteenth century in the same town of Hunucmá, the percentage of 
peasants living on haciendas rose to approximately 50%. While cautioning that these 
estimates may be inflated, Joseph (1982, 55-56) reports an estimate by Frank 
                                                       
7 The pact between International Harvester and Molina and Co. channeled loan capital through the 
governor’s son-in-law Montes and friends (some thirty inter-connected planter families; aka “The Divine 
Caste”) to the planters, securing liens on future fiber production and often mortgages on the plantations 
themselves, which enabled the trust to dictate the future price at which the producers would be forced to 
sell to them (Joseph, 1982, 56).  
8 The henequen zone ringed the city of Merida and it was here where we see mono-crop production. Batt 
(1991, 205) argues that haciendas outside the henequen zone maintained a more diversified productive 
base. In the eastern region, both henequen and cane were cultivated and processed for regional and 
international markets while in the south and east of the state, maize, cattle, and yucca were raised for 
sale and for local consumption. 
9 Brannon and Baklanoff (1987, 30) argue that the Caste War “basically destroyed the sugar industry” and 
seriously reduced cattle grazing.  
   7
Tannenbaum that “by 1910 at least 75 percent of all rural dwellers in Yucatan resided 
on large estates” and by George McBride that “96.4 percent of all family heads had no 
land of their own by 1910.” In contrast to corn and cattle haciendas, sugar and 
henequen production was much more labor intensive. In the case of sugar, full-time 
workers were needed only at harvest time, while harvesting of henequen was year-
round, as was the clearing, planting, and weeding.  
Given the tight connection between economic and political power, Yucatecan 
henequeneros could count on the law to support them in their efforts to secure land and 
labor. “Liberal” land laws facilitated the acquisition of additional land by hacendados as 
production increased. Betancourt (1953, 52) reports an estimate that, in the three 
decades after 1878, 134,000 hectares of ejido land were expropriated by haciendas. At 
the state level, laws were passed in 1843 and 1882 that legitimized the use of debt 
peonage as a bonding mechanism. While peonage had been outlawed by the 1857 
Constitution, the use of debts to tie labor to hacendados was legal in Yucatan.
10  
The law further restricted worker mobility by granting an exemption from military 
service to all permanent laborers attached to haciendas.
11 State law obliged all males 
between the ages of 15 and 60 to serve in the militia (Wells and Joseph 1996, 154). The 
easiest and least expensive way that peasants could avoid the leva, which was widely 
feared and hated, was to attach themselves to a hacienda as full-time, indebted workers 
(Wells 1985, 160). Being a peon on a hacienda also exempted peasants from labor 
drafts for road-building or public works, which, though illegal according to Mexican law, 
was common-practice in the Yucatan. In short, residing and working on a hacienda may 
well have been the best choice among otherwise worse alternatives.  
While the 1857 Constitution guaranteed male citizens the right to vote and be 
voted into public office, in practice, poll-taxes and other barriers prevented many 
individuals, including most Maya peasants, from exercising their rights. Writing about 
                                                       
10 According to Wells and Joseph (1996, 157-158): “An 1882 state law, Ley Agrícola Industrial del Estado 
de Yucatan, reiterated earlier peonage laws, stipulating that the peon who left work without paying the 
sums he owed might be legally prosecuted…If an indebted servant escaped and took refuge on another 
estate, the landowner who hid the servant could be arrested.” 
11 These laws bear a striking resemblance to the agricultural deferments from the U.S. draft during World 
War II. Alston and Ferrie (1999) argue that Southern plantation owners through their political agents were 
instrumental in establishing the deferments.  
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Hunucmá, Eiss argues that local notables and landowners “rotated in power in local 
government positions, using political office to support the enforcement of forced labor, 
indebted servitude, and their expropriation of land and labor more generally” (Eiss 2007, 
27). Close ties between local justices of the peace and district-level jefes políticos made 
it very difficult for poor people to find relief in the court system. Wells and Joseph assert 
that “in many cases, collaboration was cemented by kinship ties between hacendados 
and state officials” (Wells and Joseph 1996, 158).  
In sum, liberal land policies, the lack of enforcement of constitutional guarantees, 
and state laws that obliged Maya to serve as conscripts and work on road gangs without 
pay generally reduced Maya autonomy.  Besides the institutional and cultural forces that 
kept workers tied to the haciendas, ecological factors also played a crucial role in 
immobilizing labor. 
IIIa. Ecological Context: Yucatan 
The Yucatan peninsula consists of a large block of limestone covered by a very 
thin layer of topsoil, making slash and burn—with a twelve year cycle of land rotation—
the standard method of agriculture. There are no lakes or rivers in the henequen zone. 
The default vegetation is a low-lying tropical forest. During the Porfiriato, water was 
pumped from wells using windmills or accessed through cenotes, water-filled sinkholes 
that dot the landscape. Control of these cenotes lay in the hands of haciendas, whose 
central houses often were located near or on top of them. Weather also played a crucial 
role in the life of the hacienda. The high temperatures average above 90 degrees 
Fahrenheit from March through September, making travel and work difficult. Droughts –
such as the one from 1903 to 1904 – increased the variance of agricultural output 
(Hartmann 1966, 193). Finally, the peninsula is prone to locust plagues. These hit the 
peninsula from 1881 to 1886 and led to widespread destruction of the maize crops. Gill 
(1991, 41) notes that the plagues of the 1880s contributed to an increase in the 
population on haciendas from 21,000 to 26,000 in those years. Locust plagues from 
1907 to 1911 increased the bargaining power of henequeneros and led to increased 
violence between workers and bosses (Wells and Joseph 1996, 174-175). droughts and 
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locust plagues left peasants with the unfortunate choice of starvation or moving to a 
hacienda (Eiss 2007, 16; Gill 1991, 43-45; and Wells 1985, 94). 
IIIb. Henequen 
The henequen plant is a member of the agave family (Agave fourcroydes), and is 
well-suited to Yucatan’s climate, particularly the relatively drier, rockier northwestern 
region of the state. Henequen has been grown since pre-Columbian times for the long, 
tough fibers that can be harvested from its leaves. For centuries, Maya manually 
harvested, rasped, and treated these fibers to make rope and baskets. Prior to the 
henequen boom, the most time consuming segment of the production process was the 
removal of the fibers from the henequen leaf. Cultivation, mostly for domestic use, 
continued through the Colonial period; any surplus was made into ropes and shipped to 
Veracruz or Cuba through the Yucatecan port of Sisal (Millet Cámara 2006, 85). It was 
not until the invention of mechanical rasper (desfibradora) in the late 1850s that 
production of the crop became commercially viable.
12 Demand for unskilled labor rose 
dramatically as production levels increased. Due to the invention of the mechanical 
rasper, the bottleneck in production switched from rasping to weeding the henequen 
fields and cutting the leaves, which needed to be done year-round. Daily, a typical 
worker weeded 1-2 mecates or cut roughly 2000 leaves.
13 These leaves needed to be 
processed within a couple of days or they became dry and unusable. Therefore the 
henequen plantation took on some aspects of industrial production, with the machine 
room and rasping machines at the heart of production.
14 
Henequen plants take five to seven years to reach maturity and produce their 
first harvest. After that, 12 leaves (pencas) are cut four times a year. Since plants 
mature at differing times, workers are kept busy harvesting almost the entire year. 
                                                       
12 The rasping machine was invented by a Yucatecan, José Esteban Solís, in a competition sponsored by 
the state government. The mechanical rasper was akin to the cotton gin in terms of decreasing the costs 
of processing the plant.  
13 Roughly 25 mecates are in a hectare. 
14 The growing and harvesting of henequen differs from sugar in that henequen can be harvested year 
round, leading to a constant labor demand. Henequen processing is similar to the processing of sugar in 
that once harvested both plants need to be processed within a certain period of time to obtain the optimal 
yields from the plant. See Dye (1998) for a discussion of the contracts that arose in Cuba to reduce hold-
up in sugar processing. 
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Harvesting involves six distinct operations: 1) cutting the leaf itself; 2) removing the end 
spine; 3) shearing off the side spines; 4) gathering the leaves; 5) tying the leaves in 
bundles of 50; and 6) transporting the bundles to the tramway (Peniche 1994, 77). In 
addition to periodic harvesting, over the course of its 25-year life span henequen plants 
require periodic weeding. Given the long lead time before plants can be harvested, the 
need for plants to grow between harvests, and the continuous need for firewood to fuel 
the machinery, henequen production required workers to be dispersed throughout the 
hacienda, raising monitoring costs.  
Compared to haciendas in other regions of Mexico during the Porfiriato, 
Yucatecan haciendas were small. Many, if not most, were between 1,000 and 2,000 
hectares in size (Chardon 1960, 64). Even Yucatan’s most extensive hacienda, San 
Gerónimo Yaxcopoil, was about 11,000 hectares, which pales in comparison to the 
largest haciendas in the north of Mexico.
 15 The henequen boom, or auge, was made 
possible by the invention in 1878 of the twine-binding harvester in the United States 
(McCormick reaper). The reaper required a biodegradable twine whose supply was 
certain. Henequen’s three to four foot long fibers and general imperviousness to 
disease and pestilence fulfilled that need perfectly. Throughout the auge, Yucatan 
exported virtually all of the henequen it produced to the United States, largely for use as 
twine. The height of the boom came in the 1910s, when henequen was by far the most 
important Mexican export crop to the United States, averaging $24 million a year for the 
decade.
16 Fox (1961, 221) reports that, in 1916, 1100 haciendas cultivated 790 
thousand acres of henequen and 850 rasping mills processed the fiber for export. 
IVa. Multiple Margins of Labor Compensation  
A range of contractual options was available to managers of henequen 
haciendas in the Yucatan.
17 According to Cámara Zavala (1936), four general 
                                                       
15 Nickel (2006, 87) provides a map of Hacienda San Gerónimo Yaxcopoil in 1907 that shows the land in 
henequen production and in woodland. Joseph (1986, 57) notes that the extended Terrazas-Creel family 
in Chihuahua owned more than 5 million acres. 
16 This compares to averages of $5 million for coffee, $2 million for ixtle (hemp), and $2 million for sugar. 
See Haber, Razo and Mauer 2003, 327, 332 and 336. 
17 Six sources of data concerning debt peonage on henequen haciendas are available to scholars of labor 
relations. These are travelers’ diaries, interviews with workers and hacendados or their descendants 
(either after the revolution or more recently), government and church censuses, court and notary 
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categories of workers existed in the pre-boom era, but there was substantial mixing and 
innovation.
18 Renters and sharecroppers lived either on the hacienda or in a nearby 
pueblo. They paid either a fixed quantity or a share of output to the landowner. Indebted 
resident workers, or peones, worked and lived on the estate. They were tied to the 
estate via the debt they owed the hacendado. Luneros were an intermediate class. 
They worked one day a week (Monday) for the hacendado, either in compensation for a 
debt or for housing and water.
19 Finally, wage earners lived in the pueblo and worked 
on a casual basis for employers.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
During the henequen boom, the lunero contract was largely abandoned in the 
central henequen zone, as the workers operating under this contract became more 
indebted to the hacienda and became full-time employees.
20 Peons were the 
permanent, indebted work force of the hacienda.
21 Three other types of workers 
continued to work on the haciendas. Salaried workers such as foremen and machinists 
earned a flat weekly or monthly salary. Casual laborers worked intermittently on the 
 
documents, contemporary newspaper reports, and hacienda records. The data are generally scattered, 
and finding a detailed set of information concerning a particular region or a particular hacienda is quite 
difficult. Several factors have led to the scarcity of data in the Yucatan. First, the climate makes 
preserving paper records difficult. The papers are often brittle and have been eaten by a variety of 
vermin. Second, the revolution may have induced many owners to destroy any records of debt peonage. 
Third, destruction of papers may have been due to space constraints. Kirk (1975, 141) reports that his 
search for henequenero documents ended with a statement that the documents  “had been stored in a 
warehouse for a time but were finally burned.” Finally, those data that still exist are often in private 
collections and are difficult for researchers to access. 
18 Cámara Zavala was a member of the same Cámara family who owned Hacienda Itzincab-Cámara 
(1898-1996), which is our principal case study in this paper.  
19 The lunero system had its historical roots in the colonial era, when hacendados advanced Maya money 
so that they could pay their tributes and taxes. In exchange, the Maya would work one day a week on the 
hacienda (Chardon, 1960, 36). 
20 Indeed, the term lunero became synonymous with a full-time employee. Some vestiges of the old 
lunero system still existed. On Hacienda Tabi, workers who owed between 100 and 200 pesos worked for 
a short, specified period of time; workers who owed between 200 and 300 pesos worked every other 
week; and workers who owed more than 300 pesos were full-time employees (Rejón, 1993, 83; Meyers 
and Carlson 2002, 229). This subtlety in the debt structure may have been due to Tabi’s location on the 
periphery of the henequen zone. 
21 Peons were recorded in the accounting books of the hacienda in several ways. First, they were in the 
cuentas corrientes, the running account books of the hacienda. These books listed the reason for 
incurring debt, its amount, and the date of the loan. The nómina was a list of employees that included 
titles and job descriptions. The semanarios, or the weekly work ledger, generally listed the name, the 
daily activity and output of the worker, the daily wage, and the weekly wage. Some also listed the rations 
given to the workers. A carta cuenta was recorded if a worker’s debt was bought from or sold to another 
hacienda. Finally, workers could be listed in the probate records of a hacendado. Their debts were listed 
either individually or more commonly as a group. 
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hacienda for a piece rate wage during periods of high labor demand. Less commonly, 
debt-free sharecroppers continued to exist in some areas (Meyers and Carlson 2002, 
230, fn 5). Haciendas drew their labor from a variety of sources: local, national, and 
international. The most obvious labor source was the local pueblo. The Maya were tied 
historically to their ancestral lands and had a preference for staying in the region 
(Baerlein 1914, 155). This preference shaped the margins of the contracts that 
hacendados used with their Mayan workers. Despite a preference by “locals” for staying 
in the area, during the boom times of henequen Maya laborers also were imported from 
other regions of the Yucatan, for instance from regions hit by locust plagues or 
droughts. Laborers were drawn from other regions of Mexico, most notably from the 
north – the Yaquis – and from the central highlands – generically known as 
Mexicanos.
22 Finally, experiments in drawing workers from abroad included Koreans, 
Cubans, Chinese, and Italians. 
The exact terms of the labor contracts between peons and hacendados varied 
widely and are difficult to generalize. Travelers’ accounts generally agree that the 
workday began early in the morning, probably around 3 a.m. Turner (1910, 20) reports 
that peons worked from 3:45 until dark and required the help of family members to fulfill 
their daily tasks. Baerlein (1914, 155) reports that hacendados transformed the 
traditional communal labor, the fajina, into several “unpaid” hours of work per day. Batt 
(1991) reports that in the eastern Espita region, the fajina lasted for 4-5 hours and the 
workday ended at 7 p.m. Narváez (1992), however, reports from a personal interview 
with an ex-peon that the workday started at 3 a.m. and ended at noon for the majority of 
the workers. Only those workers assigned to rasping or drying worked through the 
afternoon. Hartmann (1966, 115-116) generalizes that the workday commenced at 4 
a.m., began with 20 minutes to two hours worth of fajina, and generally ended at 2 to 3 
p.m.  
While it is clear that working conditions were harsh during the boom, the lack of 
clear evidence on the structure of the workday and the duties of the workers makes 
                                                       
22 Since the Yaquis were sent to Yucatan as prisoners or war, working conditions were very harsh for 
them (see Wells and Joseph 1996, 164, 206). 
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quantifying the degree of harshness difficult. For instance, while semanarios indicate 
that workers during the boom typically cut between 1,000 and 2,500 leaves per day or 
cleared between one and two mecate of land, Chardon (1960, 104) reports that workers 
on haciendas and ejidos in 1950 harvested between 2,000 and 2,500 leaves per day or 
weeded between three and four mecate of land, more if they were assisted by their 
sons. The lower level of measured productivity in the earlier period is most likely due to 
the other “unpaid” duties that workers needed to perform during the course of the day. 
Hartman (1966, 123-124), who describes the labor conditions as “benevolent serfdom,” 
states that “the average daily task was three thousand leaves, an effort that could be 
performed without strain in six to eight hours.”  
The record of the role of women and children on the hacienda also varies. In her 
work on sugar haciendas in eastern Espita, Batt (1991) reports that older and younger 
male workers had shorter workdays. According to reports by ex-peons on Hacienda 
Tabi, another (mostly) sugar hacienda in southern Yucatan, children worked from a very 
young age, helping their parents. These reports indicate that the daily pay was only half 
of what a peon earned. Several accounts note that women’s and children’s work was 
considered to be supplemental to that of the men (Peniche 1994; Rejón 1993; Gill 
1991). Accounts vary as to whether women were paid for their labor. For example, 
Peniche argues that when temporary workers were needed to cut leaves in the 
harvesting process, married cutters often employed their wives and children. Women 
never went to work in the fields alone, but rather accompanied their husbands. In her 
case study of Hacienda Tabi, Rejón (1993, 75) notes that the male workers during the 
June sugar harvest were so busy that the women and the children helped in the 
planting, hoeing, and harvesting of corn and other indigenous crops.  According to Don 
Nicolás Villarreal, an ex-peón on Hacienda Tabi, women’s work in the campo 
(countryside) consisted of caring for the pigs and small birds and planting and 
harvesting chiles and tomatoes. On Hacienda Tabi Don Nicolás reported eight hectares 
of vegetables cultivated with female labor, for which the women were paid a salary of 
50-70 centavos per day. Finally, Peniche (1994) and Gill (1991) both note that within 
Maya families, women’s labor was considered part of the unpaid informal household 
economy and that the hacienda system exploited this practice. In addition to these 
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unpaid agricultural chores, women performed unpaid domestic services in the houses of 
the hacendados. 
23 
Compensation for work occurred on multiple margins. Peons were paid for their 
weekly work either in cash or in fichas, hacienda-issued coins.
24 Some haciendas gave 
a ration of corn to each worker. Haciendas provided some food and water during the 
workday. Tying themselves to a hacienda also gave many workers milpa, a plot of land 
used for subsistence agriculture.
25 The milpa was very important to the Maya since 
many lost their property rights to land after the liberalization of land laws in 1856. 
Haciendas offered resident peons housing, medical care, and in some cases education 
for the young. The tienda de raya (company store) sold staples such as corn and 
clothing. There is mixed evidence as to whether prices at the tiendas de raya were 
much higher than prevailing elsewhere (Arnold and Frost 1909, 325; Turner 1910, 18; 
and Joseph 1986, 68) or if prices were actually subsidized during certain periods in 
order to maintain social stability on the hacienda (Gill 1991, 142; and Peniche 1994, 
84). As noted earlier, classification as a resident of a hacienda exempted workers from 
conscription, either into the army or into road corvées. Finally, owners provided loans to 
workers for a variety of purposes. 
IVb. Debt Peonage in Perspective 
The exact contractual role that debt played during the henequen boom is often 
described in the literature in vague terms. Travelers’ accounts generally note that debt 
                                                       
23 The Mayan custom of women not working independently gave hacendados an advantage in using debt 
because it would not have been considered proper for spouses to work off the debt of their husbands.  
24 See Leslie and Pradeau (1972) for a description and illustrations of these coins from a large sample of 
haciendas. 
25 Baerlein (1914, 166) reports that the continued granting of milpa in the late boom era was more 
common in areas further from Merida, but had nearly disappeared in the henequen zone by the time of 
his writing. Describing the importance of the milpa, he reports that, “In his gun and in his milpa lies the 
Indian’s happiness.” Consistent with Baerlein’s observations, Wells and Joseph (1999, 163) argue that 
workers on haciendas in the henequen zone lost their right to milpa over time, and Batt (1991) argues 
that in Espita, an outlying region, access to milpa continued to be an important form of compensation. 
Hacienda Tabi, also on the periphery, continued to supply milpa (Rejón 1993). The continued granting of 
milpa on the periphery may have been due either to the greater bargaining power of the workers or the 
lower opportunity cost of leaving land in non-henequen production. Contradicting this view of declining 
milpa in the henequen zone, Gill (2001, 342-354) argues that sufficient land was available for milpa on 
most haciendas, even in the central henequen zone. 
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existed and that laborers became enslaved once in debt. Weyl (1902, 43) provides one 
of the earlier and clearer descriptions of the debt mechanism: 
Upon reaching early manhood, at 18 or 20, the young Yucatecan, in order to be 
enabled to marry, borrows from $100 to $200 from his patron. It is not expected 
that he will ever repay this debt, and no effort is made either to repay or reduce it.  
On the contrary, it is usually increased from time to time through occasional 
misfortunes which befall the peon or his family, or through additional advances 
made by the planter. The amount of debt thus represents the cost of 
emancipation, which is not desired or attempted, especially as it may represent 
the gross wages of several years. …  
Arnold and Frost (1909) viewed hacendados as essentially motivated by 
economic interests: “As a rule it may be said that the Yucatecan is a benevolent master. 
It pays him to be so, and every Yucatecan’s one rule in life is to do what pays him. 
Indeed there is really no reason for him to be harsh. The average Indian is as 
submissive as a well-whipped hound, creeping up after a thrashing to kiss his master’s 
hand” (1909, 333). They highlight the use of debt to tie workers to the hacienda, and 
claim that the books of the hacendados  were cooked to inflate the debt if the worker 
tried to leave.
26  
Joseph (1986) breaks the revolutionary and post-revolutionary literature on debt 
peonage into critics and apologists. Critics generally portrayed the system as 
oppressive and exploitative, while apologists highlighted the paternalistic relationship 
between hacendados and peones. Both groups characterized Maya workers as docile: 
the critics to highlight the complete subjugation of the workforce and the apologists as 
evidence of the consensual nature of employment.  
Wells and Joseph (1996) strongly critique this narrative of docility, highlighting 
instead the agency on the part of workers and their ability to resist the hacendados in 
myriad ways. They argue that three forces led workers to choose to stay on the 
haciendas. First, both legal and ecological factors served to isolate the hacienda from 
the outside world. Second, hacendados used coercion in the form of debt peonage and 
                                                       
26 Arnold and Frost (1909, 332) offer three arguments for why there was no exit or revolt: 1) the church 
brainwashed the Maya into thinking this was their proper lot in life; 2) the Maya were beaten into 
submission as a race; and 3) hacendados controlled all of the water by owning the cenotes, so leaving 
the hacienda was almost impossible. 
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corporal punishment to control the workers. Finally, hacendados offered security in the 
form of a steady supply of food and a “tepid brand of paternalism.”  
Nickel (1996) has been most critical of the standard interpretation of debt 
peonage in Yucatan, arguing that the eyewitness accounts of Turner, Arnold and Frost, 
and Baerlein, combined with the revolutionary narratives seeking justification for Díaz’s 
overthrow, are the primary sources for critiques of the hacienda system. While not 
denying that conditions could be harsh on the haciendas, he finds that for the period 
1893 to 1912, for which he has generated a sample of 1542 observations on individual’s 
debts, workers held a median of 133.40 pesos worth of debt, equivalent, according to 
Nickel, to the debt held by workers in other regions of Mexico when adjusted for higher 
salaries in Yucatan. 
Peniche (1994, 82-83) argues that acquiring debt was a way for workers both to 
meet their physical needs as well as to fulfill social obligations. Physical needs included 
medical care or large purchases from the tienda de raya, while social obligations 
included baptisms, marriages, and fiestas. These large debts were recorded in the 
accounting books of the hacienda. According to Peniche, the nohoch cuenta was not 
repayable.
27  
Peniche argues that hacienda owners saw the nohoch cuenta as a way of 
maintaining a stable work force while also establishing relative peace on their haciendas 
by providing funding for social functions that the workers valued highly.
28 In the 
exchange for debt, hacendados and peons engaged in a kind of reciprocal relationship. 
The servants viewed the loans as part of the hacendado’s responsibilities – workers 
offered labor and hacendados offered loans (Peniche 1999 and 1994, 84). Peniche 
argues that this social pact was based on a shared sense of social obligations between 
hacendados and their servants, which was rooted in the Catholic Church and its 
                                                       
27 There is some evidence that the large debts were paid off. Peniche (1993) finds that of the 102 peones 
on the haciendas of José Maria Peon, 19 paid off their debts and 15 transferred to another hacienda not 
owned by Peon, most likely after the debt was paid by the new hacendado. 
28 Peniche argues that within the henequen zone, the hacendado solidified his own central role in the 
Maya community by adopting the role of the casamentero (marriage maker), and supplying the mu’huul 
(bridewealth), thereby usurping the role of the groom’s family. 
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religious celebrations and sacraments. 
29Peniche also notes that non-Maya workers, 
those from outside Yucatan who came to work on the henequen haciendas, did not 
incur large debts to pay for religious ceremonies. According to Peniche, loans were not 
offered to these workers because public religious ceremonies meant less to them, and 
because hacendados believed that non-Maya would not honor their debts (personal 
communication).  
IVc. Coercion, Culture, and Contracting 
As noted in the introduction, we make three points concerning debt peonage in 
Yucatan. These relate to the choices made in a coercive institutional environment, the 
importance of culture in shaping preferences, and the use of paternalism as the 
contractual choice to attract, motivate and retain labor. The choice to become a peón 
acasillado was made within an institutional context that gave Maya peasants very little 
power. Their communal lands had been restricted, their rights to vote were limited, and 
their recourse to the court system was minimal. As was noted previously, a list of 
ecological factors can be added to the institutional ones. The climate was a hard one in 
which to travel, water was restricted to wells or cenotes, and plague or drought often 
reduced agricultural output. Given the risks, being tied to a hacienda was often the best 
of a set of bad choices. In this section, we first describe the options available to Maya 
workers and then analyze the timing and function of debt. 
Broadly speaking, once tied to a hacienda through debt, Maya peasants had 
three paths they could take, depending on their tolerance for their living conditions. 
First, they could accept their circumstances and continue to work on the hacienda within 
the general framework created by the hacendado. Second, they could stay on the 
                                                       
29 Since the time of the Conquest, native customs and practices evolved, forming a syncretic blend of 
Hispanic (Spanish) and native Maya "traditions." Farriss (1984, 90-95; ch. 10) suggests that Maya beliefs 
and practices occupied a private, clandestine sphere while Christian rites were professed and practiced 
publicly. Catholicism has also provided a cohesive set of social and cultural norms for both Maya and 
non-Maya Yucatecos. While Catholic rituals have never completely replaced Maya customs and religious 
beliefs, local devotion to Catholic saints and icons form the backbone of pueblo religiosity. Bracamonte y 
Sosa (1994, 106) notes that on henequen haciendas in the nineteenth century "each plantation erected a 
chapel dedicated to the patron saint to which the Maya rendered devotion; at the same time, Maya 
recreated many aspects of Maya Christianity [on the plantations]." 
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hacienda, but attempt to resist the hacendado’s power using explicit forms of resistance 
and what Scott (1985) famously has dubbed the “weapons of the weak.” Third, they 
could attempt to exit the hacienda, either by fleeing or by demanding their carta cuenta 
and seeking another hacendado to purchase their debt. 
A great deal of variability has been documented in the management styles of 
haciendas. Given their position as the de facto government, hacendados and their 
administrators had tremendous leeway in how they treated their workers. While some 
were more liberal in their policies, some administrators were very cruel, leading to 
workers being beaten arbitrarily and occasionally beaten to death. Oral histories, 
eyewitness accounts, newspaper reports, and a rich judicial record all provide 
consistent evidence on the use of physical coercion (see Eiss 2007; Wells and Joseph 
1996, 156-60). While the court records provide evidence of particularly cruel or 
sensational violence, other sources of evidence indicate that beatings were 
administered mainly for drunkenness, theft, adultery, or failure to meet a specified level 
of productivity. Beatings for these purposes seem to have been tolerated by the Maya, 
or at least did not lead to widespread social unrest. When José Cruz Tun, who was born 
in 1886 and lived on a sugar hacienda on the fringe of the henequen zone, was asked 
whether he was ever beaten, he responded: “Never, because my family and I always 
followed the rules, we never fought” (Rejón 1993, 92-93).  In another oral history, 
Nicolás Dzul reports beatings for unexcused absences from work, drunkenness, 
stealing, and adultery. His main recollections though were the beatings for drunkenness 
(Narváez 1992). 
Wells and Joseph (1996) report many instances of peasant uprisings against 
hacienda authority, both from within the hacienda and from the neighboring pueblos. 
Documented cases of protest include peasant demonstrations against wage cuts, 
arson, and rustling. On Hacienda Catmís, whose administration had a reputation for 
being “notoriously brutal,” the “peons destroyed machinery and carved up the 
hacendado and members of his family and staff” (Wells and Joseph 1996, 175). 
Henequen is a long lived asset, with a lifespan of about 25 years so hacendados had 
reason to fear sabotage if they mistreated their workers.  Gill (1991, 66 and 74) reports 
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the destruction by arson of Hacienda Chablé’s henequen fields in 1890 and of Hacienda 
Sinkehuel’s dyewood stands in 1892. With long-lived assets of these sorts, peasant 
unrest had a valuable target. Indeed, the Merida paper La Revista, in an 1890 defense 
of the hacienda system, argued that it “made very little sense to mistreat men upon 
whom the harvesting of very expensive crops depended” (quoted in Hartman 1966, 
121). These documented cases of peasant protest were most likely only the tip of the 
iceberg of informal peasant bargaining power, which included work slowdowns, feigned 
illness, petty theft, and carelessness with machinery.  
The final path down which indebted peasants could travel was exit. On some 
haciendas, evidence exists of the sale and purchase of peasants’ debt through the carta 
cuenta. Legally, any peon could approach the hacendado and demand his carta cuenta. 
This carta cuenta could then be taken to another hacienda. If the new hacendado 
wanted the worker, he could pay off the original debt. The ability to find another 
hacendado to purchase the carta cuenta was greater in the central henequen zone 
where haciendas were closely located. Workers could also flee. This option seemed to 
be more viable earlier during the henequen boom and on the eastern and southern 
periphery of the henequen zone, where indebted workers had a greater ability to flee to 
the forests controlled by rebel Maya. By the latter part of the henequen boom, 
transportation (railroad) and communication (telegraph) had improved the ability of 
authorities to apprehend fugitives (Gill 1991).  
Labor relations on a hacienda fell between two endpoints on a spectrum. The 
first, and relatively more humane, was one in which market based incentives continued 
to be used as the primary means of motivating workers, with beatings used for 
punishment of hacendado-defined “crimes” or unacceptable work effort. The other is 
one in which hacendado violence and worker protest fed on one another and led to 
working conditions spiraling down to a highly oppressive state. Evidence of the former 
type are found in the existing records of the haciendas, the accounts by “apologists” and 
the general lack of mention of a hacienda in the court records, while evidence of the 
latter are found in the eyewitness reports, opposition newspapers, and the court 
records. 
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Offering a package of paternalism to workers may have been more cost effective 
than either using violence or raising the salary margin of the contract to increase work 
effort. We argue that loans were part of this package and served three purposes. First, 
they were bonuses, usually in the form of a household item or small luxury, for high job 
performance. Second, they served an insurance function, helping the workers through 
tough stretches, particularly episodes of illness. Finally, when given for marriages, they 
were an important part of the social fabric of a hacienda, elevating the social status of 
the hacendado among the Maya workers. In all three cases, the hacendado gave a gift 
to the worker, a gift that required reciprocity in the form of loyalty. An alternative would 
have been to raise salaries, but doing so most likely would have been more expensive 
and would not have raised the hacendado’s status as the benevolent patron.  
Loans for events such as weddings and community fiestas tied locals more 
closely to other workers on the hacienda and to the hacendado. It is not surprising that 
most loans were targeted at settling the worker on the hacienda. During our time period, 
both the hacendados and the church encouraged large weddings. Within Maya 
communities, hosting wedding ceremonies in which the entire community was invited 
was a fundamental element of social cohesion. While the Christian forms of these 
ritualized celebrations (baptisms, weddings, funerals) were introduced by the Catholic 
Church during the colonial period, the rituals performed on the haciendas were a hybrid 
of both traditions. The social capital generated from hosting a wedding was location 
specific to the community in which it was held. Investing in a wedding was a signal of a 
commitment to the community and the entry of the couple into adulthood. Having a 
strong social network established bonds and generated greater levels of trust within the 
community. Being a community insider lowered transaction costs and allowed for risk 
sharing with other members of the network. Most importantly from a contractual 
standpoint, it gave ample bargaining power to the hacendado, the central contractual 
agent on the hacienda.
30  
                                                       
30 Taking on debt at the time of marriage may have roots in widespread Mayan cultural practices 
throughout southeastern Mexico. Júarez (2001) states that in the early twentieth century highland 
Chiapas, “young [Maya] men become indebted to their relatives in order to obtain the bride-gifts needed 
to marry” (Júarez 2001, 137). Júarez also notes the use of haancab (bride-service) in parts of Quintana 
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Loans were part of a larger set of paternalistic goods offered by hacendados to 
workers, including land for milpa, corn rations when prices were high, access to water, 
medical care, and, on some haciendas, schooling for children. Paternalism reduced risk 
for both parties. For hacendados, offering paternalism helped ensure a steady year-
round labor force, not a small concern in conditions of labor scarcity and high demand. 
Paternalism protected workers from the vagaries of agricultural life, periodic locust 
plagues, military and corvée service, and other unforeseen catastrophes. Workers, 
however, had to weigh these benefits against the costs of living on a hacienda: loss of 
autonomy, backbreaking year-round labor, separation from traditional pueblo life 
centered on the milpa, and the uncertainty of hacendado benevolence. These costs 
made it necessary for hacendados to offer incentives to attract, motivate, and retain 
workers, even while the institutional context was tilted heavily in their favor. 
The way debt functioned on henequen haciendas in Yucatan bears two 
similarities to the paternalistic agricultural labor system used in the postbellum U.S. 
South prior to the mechanization of cotton. In the U.S. South, landlords and workers 
implicitly exchanged goods in kind for loyal labor services (Alston and Ferrie, 1999). The 
in-kind goods valued most by workers in the South were those that could not be 
purchased in the market, for example, protection from civil rights abuses. Marriages on 
henequen haciendas in Yucatan were similar in that the workers did not have sufficient 
funds to pay for a lavish wedding. This debt tied workers to a hacienda and was a 
preferred outcome for many Maya given the importance of these events in Mayan 
culture and the lack of outside options.
31 The following section expands on this 
discussion of the use of debt by focusing on a single hacienda for which we have 
detailed records. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Roo, where the groom “lives and works with the bride’s family” for a number of years after marriage 
(Júarez 2001:133 ). 
31 Not all workers were equally dependent on hacendados to provide funds for ritual ceremonies and 
larger purchases. Narváez (1992) provides testimonies from ex-peons who say that they (or people they 
knew) paid for their own weddings from funds they had saved, thus not going into debt.  
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V. Case Study: Hacienda Itzincab-Cámara 
Itzincab-Cámara is located in the municipality of Tecoh, roughly 35 kilometers 
from Merida and was purchased in 1898 by Camilo G. Cámara for the commercial 
production of henequen.
32 Cámara was a businessman who came from a family of 
henequen hacendados; in 1890 Cámara had been elected Manager-Director of 
Yucatan’s Union of Henequen Hacendados (based in Merida). While Itzincab-Cámara 
served as a place of rest and relaxation for the Cámara family, its principal purpose was 
commercial. At its height, hacienda lands encompassed 3,903 hectares, of which 1,300 
were dedicated to henequen.
33  
Records from the early 20
th century indicate that the hacienda had a standard 
organizational hierarchy. Among the salaried workers, the first and highest ranking is 
the mayordomo, or administrator, who represented the owner in his absence. (This was 
not as much of an issue at Itzincab-Cámara as the owners kept a close watch on the 
place.) The central function of the mayordomo was to manage the work force, to 
maintain strict control of the accounts and production, and to procure and administer all 
the material resources of the hacienda. Under the mayordomo was the personero, in 
charge of human resources on the hacienda, followed by the maquinista, who was in 
charge of all matters related to the operation of the rasping machine. Two additional 
mayordomos, of campo (agriculture) and of rasping, appeared on the list and were 
responsible for all workers in their area. The hacienda also hired a teacher, listed as la 
profesora in some years and el professor de musica in others. The semanarios listed 
                                                       
32 Data concerning this hacienda come from a host of civil and parish records dating from 1880 to 1920, 
the debt book from 1906 to 1912, weekly activity reports from select years from 1897 to 1914, entries 
from the hacienda’s store from 1908 and 1910, and records of payments to outside workers from 1908 
and 1913.The Church of the Latter Day Saints (LDS) provided access to the civil and parish records. All 
citations to these data refer to LDS microfilm reel numbers. All information from the debt book is taken 
from Nickel (1997a and 1997b). All remaining records are from the hacienda’s archive, housed at 
CIESAS-Peninsular (Merida). Much of the descriptive information from this section is drawn from Paredes 
(1997). 
33 According to Paredes (1997), the ownership of Itzincab-Cámara stayed in the Cámara family until 
1996, when it was sold to a group of private investors (Grupo Plan). However, even by the 1930s, the 
lands owned by the family had been drastically reduced, owing mostly to the agrarian reform policies of 
post-revolutionary governments. In 1934 the hacienda was reduced to 211 hectares, to 14 hectares by 
1981 and to four by 1996. 
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the salaries (but not the names) of the hacienda’s administrators. The personero made 
about 25 pesos, while the mayordomos, blacksmith and teacher made about half that.  
The semanarios break down the other workers on the hacienda into several 
categories. The largest group was the luneros. By this time, the term luneros was used 
to refer to the full-time, indebted employees of the hacienda.
34 Muchachos, younger 
sons of the luneros, did about half the work that their fathers did (Paredes 1997, 7). 
While workers were not assigned to subcategories in 1905, by 1912, other groups listed 
on the semanarios were the Maquinistas, who worked the rasping machine, 
Aprensadores, who worked the press, Plataformeros, who worked the rail system, 
Diversos, who mostly worked in the orchard, Mayocols, who were Maya bosses, and 
masons, carpenters and cowboys. These additional categories seem to indicate 
additional levels of specialization on the hacienda over time. 
From the beginning of its operation as a henequen hacienda, Itzincab-Cámara 
imported workers from outside the state. Cubans were brought to the hacienda as early 
as 1898. On the 1905 semanarios, 22 Koreans are listed starting in May, and Yaqui 
Indians are listed as a group.
35 In addition to the challenge of labor scarcity (which was 
the case throughout the state, according to Paredes), the problem of workers deserting 
the hacienda worsened as time passed. In 1905, 11 Maya workers are listed on the 
semanarios as prófugos, or fugitives. The most consistently reported information on 
fugitives is in relation to the Koreans and the Yaqui. In 1907, for example, there were 20 
Koreans reported as being on the hacienda. Later in that same year the number 
diminished to 13 while the rest were reported as fugitives. The evidence of non-Maya 
being more likely to flee is consistent with our argument that it was much easier to tie 
local Maya to the hacienda than outsiders.  
                                                       
34 Based on work of Cámara Závala (1936), Paredes states that the luneros worked one day a week for 
the patron and performed free labor, or fajina, each Sunday; however, hacienda semanarios indicate this 
interpretation of the term luneros was no longer applicable at this time. 
35 The Koreans came in 1905 under a four-year contract. The second attempt at contracting with them 
failed. Notwithstanding the notable presence of foreigners working on the hacienda, Paredes argues that 
whenever the owners could, they substituted Maya for immigrants. For example, commissions were 
offered for native Maya from the nearby village of Timucuy, among others. Up to 1919, 66 immigrants 
continued to work in diverse jobs on the hacienda (Paredes 1997, 8).  
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The total employment on the hacienda seems fairly stable over the first decade 
of the 20
th century. The semanarios list 108 Maya workers and 26 muchachos in 1897; 
83 Maya workers, approximately 12 Yaqui, 22 Koreans, and 16 muchachos in 1905; 
and 104 Maya workers and 16 muchachos in 1912.
36 These workers were full-time. The 
hacienda records also list weeding and other work done by contract workers, most likely 
drawn from the neighboring pueblos. Their work is listed both in the semanarios and in 
record books titled Pagos por Trabajos (payments for work). Their output indicates that 
30 additional workers could have been on the hacienda at peak times. 
Compared to other hacendados of their time, the historical record suggests that 
members of the Cámara family were more paternalistic than many. The original owner 
and patriarch, Camilo Cámara, was the president of Merida’s League of Social Action 
(Liga de Acción Social). This organization collaborated with the state government after 
1910 to bring rural schools to the state. Indeed, Itzincab-Cámara was home to one of 
the 16 rural schools established at this time.
37 So while Itzincab-Cámara should not be 
viewed as a typical hacienda of the time, it probably does reflect one management 
pattern common in Yucatan during this time. 
The hacienda records indicate a rich and varied interaction between the 
hacendado and his workers. Before turning to the patterns of loans, it is useful to paint a 
broader picture of paternalism on the hacienda. Evidence includes the care for the 
elderly and the sick. In the record book titled Recibos de Tienda de Raya (receipts of 
the company store), weekly grants of 1 peso to every viuda (widow) are listed.
38 On the 
1905 semanarios, these widows are also listed as receiving a weekly ration of corn.
39 
Also listed in this book are breakfasts, consisting of biscuits, coffee, and sugar.
40 
                                                       
36 The Yaqui are listed as a group, with their total work output noted. We estimated their numbers, 
assuming that they did an equivalent amount of work per day as a Maya worker. 
37 The family had a teacher on staff as well as a priest who came regularly to perform sacraments and 
celebrate mass. Hacienda Itzincab-Cámara is easily confused with hacienda Itzincab, which is in the 
municipality of Umán, and was owned by José Palomeque, known as an abusive hacendado (personal 
communication, Paul Eiss). 
38 While the Maya widows are named, two nameless Yaqui widows also receive 1 peso. 
39 Older male Maya may also have been given reduced workloads and allowed more time to work on their 
milpa. 
40 In 1908, breakfast for all workers for a typical week consisted of approximately 4000 biscuits, 40 
pounds of sugar, and 9 pounds of ground coffee. 
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Permanent workers on the hacienda were paid more for their work than contract 
workers. For instance, resident workers were paid 37.50 while contract workers were 
paid 25 centavos per mecate for weeding. While the rate for contract workers 
occasionally increased (most likely due to market pressures), the resident workers were 
paid the same rate in 1905 and 1912. 
The debt ledger of Itzincab-Cámara offers several insights into labor practices on 
the hacienda.  The ledger includes entries for approximately 172 workers. The opening 
date is December 31, 1906 and the closing date is December 31, 1912.
41 A final tally of 
debts provided on the last page breaks down the debts into continuing and non-
continuing employees. The non-continuing employees included the deceased and non-
Maya, such as Koreans, central Mexicans, and Yaqui. All of these non-continuing debts 
were written off the books in 1912, totaling 2,895.78 pesos. The majority of this sum, 
2,400.55 pesos, was for deceased Maya employees, while the amount written off for 
imported laborers was quite small, as they tended to have debts averaging less than 
twenty pesos. For instance, the eleven Koreans listed in the debt book as having arrived 
in 1905 had an average debt of 14.50 pesos.
42 Of the twenty-one workers whose 
deaths are recorded in the debt ledger, the average debt was 139.64 pesos.
43 Worke
who fled the hacienda continued to be listed in the debt books. These debts summe




Debts for continuing Maya workers were significantly higher than for contract 
workers. For those 64 workers who opened the debt book in 1906 and were still listed in 
the weekly activity report from 1914, debts averaged 125.38 pesos in 1912, with a low 
of 28.15 pesos and a high of 239.36 pesos.
44  Still focusing on these 64 workers, we 
see that in the next 6 years after 1906, 8 workers incurred no additional debt, 29 
workers added less than 10 pesos worth of debt, 16 workers added between 10 and 20 
pesos worth of additional debt, and 9 workers added debts of between 20 and 170 
 
41 Some entries are prior to 1906 and after 1912. 
42 No record is made of the Korean workers’ debt from their indenture contract. 
43 While the books officially closed in 1912, some additional entries are made in 1913, including notes of 
death. 
44 The highest recorded debt was 367.15 pesos for Martín Pérez, who died in late 1913. Indeed, at least 
four of the eight highest debt holders died prior to 1914. For two records the final entries are illegible. 
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pesos. So for the majority of continuing workers, added debt was relatively minor: as 
examples; 2 pesos for a funeral, 2.50 pesos for clothes, 1.50 pesos for a hoe.
45  
The debt book records ten workers whose cartas cuentas were purchased by the 
hacienda between 1908 and 1910. The available information indicates that they began 
with an average debt of about 197 pesos –considerably more than the average worker – 
and took on approximately 22 pesos more debt by 1912. Based on the date of the entry, 
the last names of the workers, and the size of the initial debt, we would estimate that the 
debts of at least another four workers were purchased in order to bring them to the 
hacienda. This estimate would bring the total number of transferred workers to over 
10% of the hacienda’s adult workforce. If our estimate of the total number of transfer 
workers is correct, then a total of seven transfer workers were still on the hacienda in 
1914, four of whom were performing higher paying jobs: a carpenter, and press and rail 
operators. These workers were brought to the hacienda after the largely unsuccessful 
experiments with the Yaquis and Koreans. They may have been more skilled workers, 
or the market for new workers may have been so thin that the hacendado was forced to 
pay top price to recruit new local labor. 
No effort to record interest on the debt was made, indicating that the hacendado, 
at least explicitly, was not attempting to keep workers tied to the hacienda through high 
interest payments. If debt were solely a binding mechanism, one would expect a high 
interest rate to be used to inflate the debt. A typical worker who added significant debt 
was Secundino May, whose debt record is provided in Table 1. From the civil records of 
births and parish records of baptisms, we know that he was born on the hacienda on 
July 1, 1893 and was the son of Norberto May and Damiana Chim, both residents on 
the hacienda.
46 In 1906, at age 13, he opens the debt books with a balance of 13.51 
pesos. At age 16 he marries María Ana Ramos, age 14, daughter of Pedro Ramos and 
Ysabel Llanes.
47 At this point he takes on substantially more debt. Several months later 
                                                       
45 These relatively minor increases in debt raises the question as to whether workers mostly were paying 
for their own baptisms and other ceremonies, and whether all “gifts” from the hacendado were recorded in 
the books.  
46 Civil Register, 1893, reel 0796192. Parish Register, 1893, reel 0655046. 
47 Both the civil and parish records recorded this marriage twice. Civil Register 1910 and 1911, reel 
0796147. Parish Register 1910, reel 0764193. 
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he takes out more debt to purchase furniture. This pattern of working on the hacienda – 
in May’s case as a muchacho with low debt – followed by a large issuance of debt for a 
marriage seems to signal a commitment on both the part of the worker and the 
hacendado to a continuing employment relationship after an initial period on the 
hacienda.  
Table 1: Debt of Secundino May 1906-1911 
Page 90.  Secundino May  Owed 
31.12.1906  Balance owed after today's assessment  13.51 
03.12.1910  [Amount] taken for his marriage  25.00 
17.12.1910 Cash  and  wedding dress  40.00 
 Balance  Owed  78.51 
22.04.1911  Furniture for his house  14.00 
 Total  92.51 
Source: Nickel 1997b, 33. 
These debts indicate an ongoing relationship between the hacendado and 
families that were longstanding residents of the hacienda. In 1914, of the 128 men listed 
on the hacienda’s payroll, 23 had the surname May and 5 had the surname Ramos.
48 
The debts can be seen as a gift, not just to the recipient, but also to the families of the 
bride and groom and, to a lesser extent, to everyone who attended the marriage 
ceremony and celebration. On the hacienda, the gifts from the hacendado to the group 
included marriage celebrations, leniency towards workers, or greater autonomy. The 
debts may have had a long-run impact on the morale of workers by engendering a 
reciprocal sense of loyalty on the part of workers.  This is especially important given the 
frequency of workers laboring without supervision. We stress that, given the social 
relations of the time, debt was useful in tying workers to the hacienda both prior to 
incurring the debt as well as after the debt was given. Prior to incurring the debt, 
workers would strive to show loyalty so as to be allowed to borrow and after incurring 
the debts workers would remain loyal out of gratitude or a sense of obligation.  
                                                       
48 Other prominent family names in 1914 were Chim (16), Chan (13), and Ceh (6). 
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Aggregating the debt records of hacienda Itzincab-Cámara shows that loans 
were mostly given for location-specific cultural events, particularly weddings.
49 The 
timing of large debts for a wedding had the advantage for hacendados of tying workers 
to a hacienda at time when males were approaching the peak of their labor productivity. 
Table 2 shows the breakdown in debt by type for those entries from the debt ledger for 
which we have information, not including the purchase of the cartas cuentas. While fifty-
five percent of the debt was granted directly for weddings, some entries listed as “cash” 
were often recorded around the time of a wedding, and could be counted in that 
category.
50 The category with the highest number of entries was for general supplies, 
such as clothing, furniture, hoes, and grinding stones. Some of the larger entries in this 
category were for furniture and were recorded following a wedding. Therefore the costs 
of marrying and establishing a household could have easily accounted for over 70% of 
the debt issued to continuing residents. “Bonus” gifts were largely in kind, such as gifts 
of clothing, furniture, grinding stones, or hoes. Finally, loans that covered emergencies, 
such as funerals and medical expenses, were important forms of insurance for Maya 
workers.  
Table 2: Breakdown of Debts by Type for Continuing Workers 
Category  % of Entries  % of Debt 
Cash 25.9%  24.9% 
Weddings 25.2  54.7 
Funerals 5.2  1.7 




Medical 3.0  2.4 
Apprehension
51
  2.2 1.6 
 
                                                       
49 The hacendado paid for items such as the civil and religious fees, gifts to the bride’s family such as 
“clothes, rings, and a long necklace,” and money to cover the wedding fiesta and gifts” (Peniche 1994, 
85). Peniche (1994) estimates these outlays to be 25 pesos for the civil ceremony and celebration, 17 
pesos for the religious ceremony, and at least 8 pesos for the bridewealth. 
50 These entries listed as cash could have actually have been for credit at the tienda de raya, further tying 
the worker to the hacienda. 
51 Several entries included charges for Gastos de su aprención, or “expenses for his apprehension.” 
These seem to be for the capture of fugitive workers.  
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While the complete record of the debt ledger is unavailable, loans for particular 
years were recorded in the semanarios. We currently have records from two complete 
years, 1905 and 1912. Loans granted totaled 845.22 pesos in 1905 and 336.25 pesos 
in 1912. Total salary paid to continuing workers totaled approximately 26,000 pesos in 
both years, making loans to workers approximately one to three percent of total salary. 
Unfortunately the reason for the loan was not always recorded in the semanarios in 
1905, but in 1912, 74% of the value of all loans was to fund marriages. The smaller 
number of loans in 1912 than in 1905 reflects an overall downtown in the market for 
henequen during this time. Between 1905 and 1912, the average price of henequen fell 
from 15.31 to 10.41 cents per kilogram. While salaries stayed constant on the hacienda, 
loans to workers fell by over 60%. Sixty-seven workers received at least one loan during 
1905, while only 19 workers received loans in 1912. Our conclusion is that in good 
times, the hacendado could boost his status with relatively inexpensive gifts, while in 
tougher times, these gifts could be more easily reduced than salary. 
Recorded levels of loans for weddings varied in size. For example, in Table 1 
Secundino May received 65 pesos for his wedding and 14 pesos for furniture. Others 
received less or more. Casiano Narváez, 21 years of age, received 40 pesos in cash in 
January 1907 and then 18 pesos for his wedding in March. At age 14, Herculano Chan 
opened with 11.01 pesos of debt in 1906. He next received 30 pesos for his wedding 
and 48.50 for a terno (ceremonial dress) in March 1910, and an additional 20 pesos for 
his wedding and 6 pesos in cash in April 1910.
52 One explanation for higher wedding 
debts is that higher productivity workers received greater debts (or gifts) from the 
hacendado at the time of his wedding. Higher productivity workers may also have been 
assigned to more remunerative jobs, such as plataformeros. By granting more loans, 
the hacendado was able to keep higher productivity workers on the hacienda while at 
                                                       
52 The lag between the time of the first entry into the debt book and the time of marriage grew shorter 
over time. For those entering the debt books before June 1907, the average lag was almost 3 years. For 
those entering the books after June 1907, the marriage loan was the first entry in the debt book. 
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the same time solidifying the social status of these workers by financing an elaborate 
wedding. Debt and salary are therefore complementary mechanisms.
53  
Of the 28 males whose marriage records we have located in the municipal 
records for the years 1895 to 1912, 21 were still working on the hacienda in 1914. All of 
these remaining workers incurred debt, indicating a strong link between debt and 
continuing employment. All workers employed in 1914 whose marriages are listed in the 
municipal archives incurred debt. Only three male Maya were married on the hacienda, 
did not receive a loan for their marriage, and did not work on the hacienda in 1914.
54 
Given the strong demonstrated relationship between employment and debt, it is likely 
that either these three workers planned on leaving the hacienda, or the hacendado did 
not want to commit to these workers by offering them marriage loans.  
To explain the variation in the size of debts, we argue that debt was a cheaper 
margin to adjust than salary. Table 3 provides summary statistics on salary and debt in 
1914 by class of worker.
55 Forty of the fifty workers listed as luneros performed the 
same jobs throughout the course of the week and earned the identical salary (5.12 or 
5.13 pesos for the week). On Monday through Wednesday they gathered firewood; on 
Thursday and Friday they spun rope; and on Saturday they gathered 2500 henequen 
leaves. Only those workers who were sick or had a different job description (e.g. 
plataformero, maquina, huerto) earned a different salary. Indeed, all workers on this 
hacienda were essentially salaried, with the job description determining the salary for 
the day. Only in rare cases did two workers assigned to the same job for the day earn 
different wages. If we exclude the old (diversos) and the young (muchachos), there 
were only two major job categories, skilled and unskilled, yet within these categories 
debt varied more than salary. We can visually see the relationship between age and 
                                                       
53 This is similar to operation of paternalism in the U.S. South: tenants were more highly paid than 
sharecroppers but also typically received more paternalism from the landlord (Alston and Ferrie, 1999). 
54 Three of these four workers were married after 1906, so any debt should have been listed on the 
books. 
55 We define “class” as the actual job performed by the worker and not the heading under which the 
worker is listed in the semanario. For instance, Pedro Ceh is listed as a lunero, but he performed the job 
of a plataformero every day. Juan Pablo May was listed as a plataformero, but he gathered firewood for 
two days. In cases where the worker sometimes did the work of a lunero and sometimes did something 
else, we assign the worker to the job at which he worked the most days. 
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salary in Figure 1, which is stepwise, from the young to full adults – with differences in 
salary for luneros and skilled – to the old.
 56  Consistent with our observation of “debt 
clearing the market” we see in Figure 2 much more variation in debt in relation to age. 
Higher levels of recorded debt are due to workers having more lavish weddings, getting 
more bonus gifts in kind over the course of the years, or having more unexpected 
medical expenses. 
Table 3: Average Salary, Debt and Age of Workers Listed on 1914 
Semanario
57 














































(5)  49 - 60 













(25)  1.2 - 3  --  --  16.42 
(7)  14 - 19 
Note: Number of observations in parentheses. The category “skilled” is made up 
of all workers not assigned to one of the other categories. 
 
                                                       
56 The data on ages is often quite inconsistent, with the recorded age varying by up to a decade. When 
birth records are available and generally consistent with later age records, we use the birth record to 
determine the age. In other cases, we average the various reported ages. 
57 We group all skilled workers into one group. These include Maquinas, Aprensadores, Plataformeros, 
Asalariados y Vaqueros (Salaried and Cowboys), and Albañiles y Carpinteros (Masons and Carpenters). 
58 For the purposes of this table and the regression, the wages of those workers who were sick during 
part of the week and had reduced wages were increased to a “full health” level by extrapolating their full 
salaries from the days they worked. 
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Figure 1: Age and Salary in 1914 
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Notes: C= Child; L= Lunero or Unskilled; S=Skilled; M= Mayocol or Supervisor; and 
D= Diverso or Elderly 
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Note:  We did not include children in this Figure because they did not have any debt.  
Generalizing too much from our research on hacienda Itzincab-Cámara may be a 
mistake given the wide variety of reported practices on henequen haciendas. But our 
findings suggest patterns of salary and debt on this hacienda that were responsive in 
part to market forces. Salary generally tracked the marginal productivity of workers: 
older and younger workers, who were generally less productive, earned lower salaries. 
But most adult workers earned a salary within a very narrow range. Keeping salary 
relatively constant and allowing debt to clear the market helped the hacendado cast 
himself in the role of benevolent patron and engendered loyalty and high work effort in 
reciprocity. Rather than indicating, as Turner (1910, 12) suggests, that, “The amount of 
the debt does not matter, so long as it is debt,” our evidence suggests that the timing 
and reasons for debt were carefully considered and played important roles in motivating 




The eyewitness reports and a great deal of the historiography on Yucatecan 
henequen haciendas suggest that debt served mainly to coercively bind workers to the 
haciendas and hacendados. While debt was certainly used as one of several powerful 
mechanisms to keep workers on the haciendas, our case study indicates that debt was 
granted in a systematic manner, consistent with a paternalistic system of labor relations. 
Debt was used to bind workers to a hacienda at a young age, to reward more 
productive workers for their past efforts, and to cover unforeseen expenses. These 
three functions of debt served to attract, motivate, and ensure the continued loyalty of 
Maya peons. When considering the logic of any contractual choice, that choice needs to 
be set within its cultural and institutional context. Our findings suggest that cultural 
norms – such as the value of having large, elaborate wedding ceremonies – and the 
coercive institutional setting—such as land ownership and voting laws-- were necessary 
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